veiled4allah

disaster in Iraq

Click for larger view One of the holiest Shi'a shrines in Iraq was bombed and badly damaged, as the before and after picture above shows. In retaliation, at least 27 Sunni mosques have been attacked and at least six killed. Additionally, 11 Sunni prisoners were kidnapped and executed and there is open violence and rioting. Later: The death total ended up as 1,300, with 100 Sunni mosques attacked. In most of the cases, it appears that death squads were the culprits. Dervish writes:

To blow it up is a blasphemy of the highest order. I urge those of us in the Sunni community to immediately offer condolences and support to our Shia brethren, and while reconstruction may be impossible immediately, I further urge that we offer our support to reconstruction efforts. In the interest of peace, it's vital that our fellow Muslims in the Shia community understand that we appreciate the magnitude of this loss, and that we want to help set it aright to the greatest extent possible. Astaghfirullah, May God forgive us. Amin.

Amin. I fear that things will only get worse. A terrible day for Iraq and for us all. Later: Muslims are speaking up for peace and unity. Mosques to hold unity events this weekend. Muslims to Call for Unity After Shrine Attack. Muslim march to protest shrine bombing. Seattle Muslim groups unite to pray for peace. A Call to Conscience and a Reminder to the Muslims. Mosque Outrage Also Brings Solidarity. Long Island Islamic leaders call for unity. Forum at mosque will echo plea for Muslim unity. UT Muslims' tonight vigil to promote unity. Some interesting perspectives on what is really happening in Iraq from Sami Ramadan, Dahr Jamail, and Blood & Treasure. IPS news service has a similar report. From these reports, many ordinary Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi'a, are coming together for unity, but certain extremist elements, including Shi'a militias associated with the government, are stirring up the violence. I pray for the people of Iraq.

firebombing Fallujah

There's a lot (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, for example) of attention on an Italian news documentary alleging that the U.S. used white phosphorus on the city of Fallujah during its assault there a year ago (November 2004). See reports here and here. This is not new. As early as November 9, 2004, a report in the British Telegraph newspaper mentioned its use:

White phosphorus shells lit up the sky as armour drove through the breach and sent flaming material on to suspect insurgent haunts. Soldiers expressed the fear that with so much firepower the biggest danger was friendly fire.

Reports appeared in the Arab press by November 10 of chemical weapons and poison gas, and covered more extensively by independent journalist Dahr Jamail later that month. It also appeared in the alternative media. But this isn't the first time the issue of incindiery or chemical weapons has come up. As early as August 2003, the U.S. admitted it had used napalm. Later it lied to the UK in claiming that it had not used new-generation napalm weapon MK-77. A good discussion of these issues is Fire Bombs in Iraq: Napalm By Any Other Name. A curious twist is that Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena, whose convoy came under fire from U.S. troops in March 2005 after she had been released as a hostage, was apparently investigating the use of "unusual weapons" in Fallujah:

At the time of her abduction, Giuliana was heading to an area of Baghdad where witnesses from Fallujah are staying to interview Fallujah refugees about the US assault on their city last year. Says Sermonti: "She had some information about the use of illegal weapons by US forces in Fallujah that was very sensitive. A very hot topic. There were rumors of some use of chemicals and a number of weapons that are not legal -- like [napalm] and phosphorus."

Finally, Juan Cole has an excellent legal analysis and historical background. Update: George Monbiot provides a good summary of the evidence - from official American government and military sources - that white phosphorus and napalm were indeed used. Dahr Jamail has a follow-up, and the Independent provides a good summary of the state of play (more here). The British have WP too but claim it's only used for creating smokescreens.

strategic redeployment from Iraq

The Center for American Progress has published a "progressive exit strategy" for Iraq called Strategic Redeployment (PDF). One of the things I like most about it is that it addresses head-on the fact that we will not be able to sustain our current deployment in Iraq past the end of 2006 and certainly not longer than that (see Iraq: squaring the circle for more on this). As the paper says, there are no good options anymore, there is only a choice among options trying to find what is the least bad. I think that the Strategic Redeployment paper represents an important contribution to the national debate we need to have over Iraq. I hope that progressives can come together to discuss this along with the plans being offered by (in alphabetical order) Wes Clark, Juan Cole, Russ Feingold, Dennis Kucinich and others, find the areas of common agreement, and start to build a consensus on how we can get out of Iraq in a way that brings about the most good we can or at least causes the least harm.

the passing of Robin Cook

Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has died. More than for what he did while holding that office, he is being remembered for resigning from Blair's Cabinet over the war in Iraq. From his resignation speech:

The threshold for war should always be high. None of us can predict the death toll of civilians in the forthcoming bombardment of Iraq. But the US warning of a bombing campaign that will "shock and awe" makes it likely that casualties will be numbered at the very least in the thousands. Iraq's military strength is now less than half its size at the time of the last Gulf war. Ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate invasion. And some claim his forces are so weak, so demoralised and so badly equipped that the war will be over in days. We cannot base our military strategy on the basis that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a serious threat. Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of that term - namely, a credible device capable of being delivered against strategic city targets. It probably does still have biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions. But it has had them since the 1980s when the US sold Saddam the anthrax agents and the then British government built his chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for 20 years and which we helped to create? And why is it necessary to resort to war this week while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is frustrated by the presence of UN inspectors? I have heard it said that Iraq has had not months but 12 years in which to disarm, and our patience is exhausted. Yet it is over 30 years since resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. We do not express the same impatience with the persistent refusal of Israel to comply. What has come to trouble me most over past weeks is the suspicion that if the hanging chads in Florida had gone the other way and Al Gore had been elected, we would not now be about to commit British troops to action in Iraq.

More recently, he wrote that the struggle against terrorism cannot be won by military means:

Yesterday the prime minister described the bombings as an attack on our values as a society. In the next few days we should remember that among those values are tolerance and mutual respect for those from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Only the day before, London was celebrating its coup in winning the Olympic Games, partly through demonstrating to the world the success of our multicultural credentials. Nothing would please better those who planted yesterday's bombs than for the atrocity to breed suspicion and hostility to minorities in our own community. Defeating the terrorists also means defeating their poisonous belief that peoples of different faiths and ethnic origins cannot coexist. In the absence of anyone else owning up to yesterday's crimes, we will be subjected to a spate of articles analysing the threat of militant Islam. Ironically they will fall in the same week that we recall the tenth anniversary of the massacre at Srebrenica, when the powerful nations of Europe failed to protect 8,000 Muslims from being annihilated in the worst terrorist act in Europe of the past generation. Osama bin Laden is no more a true representative of Islam than General Mladic, who commanded the Serbian forces, could be held up as an example of Christianity. After all, it is written in the Qur'an that we were made into different peoples not that we might despise each other, but that we might understand each other. Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. Inexplicably, and with disastrous consequences, it never appears to have occurred to Washington that once Russia was out of the way, Bin Laden's organisation would turn its attention to the west. The danger now is that the west's current response to the terrorist threat compounds that original error. So long as the struggle against terrorism is conceived as a war that can be won by military means, it is doomed to fail. The more the west emphasises confrontation, the more it silences moderate voices in the Muslim world who want to speak up for cooperation. Success will only come from isolating the terrorists and denying them support, funds and recruits, which means focusing more on our common ground with the Muslim world than on what divides us.

May he rest in peace.

Iraq: squaring the circle

A lot of the debate over whether the U.S. should withdraw or "stay the course" in Iraq seems to miss a couple of points. Prime among them: we may not have any choice The reserves are "broken" (see also here), recruiting is plummeting (1, 2, 3, 4, etc), and those who are already in are getting out any way they can (not to mention this way *cough* - and see also these articles about the increasingly broken army: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The current troop presence in iraq is unsustainable (emphasis added):

Even more importantly, the human costs to the all-volunteer Army, especially, have been staggering. The Army currently has 17 brigades deployed in Iraq, from an active force of 33 brigades, which should grow to 44 brigades as the result of internal Army restructuring. Most reserve component brigades have already been called up and deployed. The result is that active duty soldiers can expect to be deployed every other year to Iraq for a year long combat tour, unless either the size of the American commitment to Iraq is reduced or the size of the active force is significantly increased. And even maintaining the force at its current size is likely to be challenging. While the active force is meeting its retention objectives, recruiting for the Army and Marine Corps is lagging behind both for the active and the reserve component. Ultimately, if the current combat levels in Iraq continue, this recruiting gap is unlikely to be closed by more financial incentives. - General Wesley Clark (ret.), April 6, 2005

We are getting toward the end of our capacity. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are incapable of sustaining the effort. Our recruiting is coming apart. The National Guard is going to unravel. - General Barry McCaffrey (ret.), June 22, 2005

See also 1, 2. And even the troop levels we have in Iraq now are not enough. If we have to make do with even fewer troops in the future - and we will without a draft - we may simply not be able to do anything effectively. Another factor overlooked by the "stay the course" proponents is whether in fact the U.S. is the cause of the insurgency or at least a factor making it worse. As the old saying goes, when you're in a hole, the first rule is to stop digging. If our presence in Iraq is making things worse, then we need to leave, not continue on to satisfy our national pride. It's true that by this point, the situation may be so bad in Iraq that even our withdrawal wouldn't fix things. But, as I said above, we may not have any choice. We may be able to stay six months or a year or even two years, but certainly not as long as it would take to genuinely stabilize Iraq (assuming that this is even possible for the U.S. to do as the cause of the problem). It's not going to be any better if we withdraw a year from now instead of today, and it may be even worse. I think we need to accept that whether we leave now or later, we're leaving behind a broken country and it's going to get worse the longer we put it off. Despite how grim these choices are, some people are trying to come up with a "third way": plans that recognize that the U.S. cannot stay much longer but attempt to respond to the objections against "cutting and running" or the consequences of catastrophic failure in Iraq. They do this by proposing to bring somebody else in to replace the U.S., hopefully somebody that won't be so hated and may be able to accomplish something good. For two years, Dennis Kucinich has been proposing to replace the U.S. troops with UN peacekeepers, an idea recently taken up by Juan Cole. A similar idea was proposed by Wes Clark (1, 2), to bring in a peacekeeping force composed of troops from Arab or Muslim countries. These plans may not be practicable - there's no guarantee that any of these countries would want to take over from the U.S. or that they would actually go over better in Iraq - but they are attempts to find a solution that recognizes the reality that we can't continue, while trying to deal with the aftermath of withdrawal in a moral manner. For this reason, I support all such plans and think we ought to give them our best efforts.

connecting the dots on Iraq

It's Sunday (well, not in this time zone, but in the UK), so it must be time for the latest weekly installment from Michael Smith of London's Sunday Times. Sure enough, here it is. During the week, Smith published an article in the Los Angeles Times revealing a bit more about how he got all the leaked memos and setting out what he thinks is the real story, the bombing campaign. Smith published another version of this article in the Sunday Times adding some information and commentary that didn't appear in the LA Times. On the second page of this article, he mentions:

Last week one US blogger, Larisa Alexandrovna of RawStory.com, unearthed more unsettling evidence. It was an overlooked interview with Lieutenant-General T Michael Moseley, the allied air commander in Iraq, in which he appears to admit that the "spikes of activity" were part of a covert air war. From June 2002 until March 20, when the ground war began, the allies flew 21,736 sorties over southern Iraq, attacking 349 carefully selected targets. The attacks, Moseley said, "laid the foundations" for the invasion, allowing allied commanders to begin the ground war. The bloggers may have found their own smoking gun.

Smith has followed up with his own article about this:

The American general who commanded allied air forces during the Iraq war appears to have admitted in a briefing to American and British officers that coalition aircraft waged a secret air war against Iraq from the middle of 2002, nine months before the invasion began. Addressing a briefing on lessons learnt from the Iraq war Lieutenant-General Michael Moseley said that in 2002 and early 2003 allied aircraft flew 21,736 sorties, dropping more than 600 bombs on 391 "carefully selected targets" before the war officially started. The nine months of allied raids "laid the foundations" for the allied victory, Moseley said. They ensured that allied forces did not have to start the war with a protracted bombardment of Iraqi positions. If those raids exceeded the need to maintain security in the no-fly zones of southern and northern Iraq, they would leave President George W Bush and Tony Blair vulnerable to allegations that they had acted illegally. Moseley's remarks have emerged after reports in The Sunday Times that showed an increase in allied bombing in southern Iraq was described in leaked minutes of a meeting of the war cabinet as "spikes of activity to put pressure on the regime". Moseley told the briefing at Nellis airbase in Nebraska on July 17, 2003, that the raids took place under cover of patrols of the southern no-fly zone; their purpose was ostensibly to protect the ethnic minorities. A leaked memo previously disclosed by The Sunday Times, detailing a meeting chaired by the prime minister and attended by Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, Geoff Hoon, the then defence secretary, and Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of defence staff, indicated that the US was carrying out the bombing. But Moseley's remarks, and figures for the amount of bombs dropped in southern Iraq during 2002, indicate that the RAF was taking as large a part in the bombing as American aircraft. Details of the Moseley briefing come amid rising concern in the US at the war. A new poll shows 60% of Americans now believe it was a mistake.

This really is old news (see also here) and Raw Story isn't the only site to pick up on it, if Raw Story got it into the Sunday Times, they deserve some credit. Try Googling "operation southern focus" and don't forget to go here.

US out, UN in

Juan Cole argues for the U.S. force in Iraq to be replaced with a UN peace enforcement force:

The United States will eventually have to go to the United Nations and request that it send a peace-enforcing mission to Iraq, as the US military withdraws. The relevant model is the UNTAC experience in Cambodia, which, while it had substantial flaws, was also a relative success. In the long term, perhaps 5-10 years, the Iraqi government may develop its own military that could keep order. That development is far enough off, however, that there is likely to be a significant gap between the time the US leaves and the time the Iraqis can fend for themselves. A US withdrawal without a United Nations replacement would risk throwing Iraq into civil war... ...The United Nations force put into Iraq should be a peace-enforcing, not a peace-keeping, force. That is, its rules of engagement should allow robust military operations to prevent the parties from massacring one another, and UN troops should always be permitted to defend themselves resolutely if attacked. Further, the United States should lend the United Nations forces close air support upon their request... ...All Iraqis would see the United Nations as having more legitimacy than the United States. The UN would be much more likely to be able to negotiate a settlement among the Sunnis and Shiites than is the US. And, the world has more troops than the US does. (The Europeans are over-stretched, so the force would mainly come from the global South. Iraq does not want neighbors involved, so South and Southeast Asia seem likely providers of troops.) Would the Iraqi government accept a United Nations military mission? Almost certainly. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has often attempted to involve the UN, and would welcome such a development. The Sunni Arabs would also much prefer to deal with the UN than with the US. Would the United Nations be willing to take it on? It would be a very hard sell. But remember that if the members of the military mission succeeded, they would have gained enormous good will from the Iraqi government, which would soon be able to pump 5 million barrels of petroleum a day. That is, participation could be worth billions in future contracts. The US could also provide substantial incentives. For countries like Pakistan, India, and Malaysia, such benefits could prove decisive. Would the Americans be willing to cede Iraq to the blue helmets? It is not impossible. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appears to want to draw down US troop strength in Iraq on a fairly short timetable, and even he must realize the need for a replacement. Of course, the Bush administration may well resist this move right to the end. But that makes this plan an ideal platform for the Democratic Party in 2006 and 2008. Instead of Kerry's vague multilateralism, let us specify an UNTAC-like mission for the UN. The entire world depends on Gulf petroleum; the entire world should step up to ensure security for Iraq and the region. The US will continue to have to bear a significant share of the costs, but these would become bearable if several allies shared them. As recently as the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower still saw the United Nations as a noble project eseential to the welfare of the United States, and he denounced the 1956 invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel for endangering the UN ideal. Ironically, the Bush administration's attempt to do a unilateral end run around the United Nations could afford the American Left the opportunity to make international cooperation and international law popular again with the US public. The alternative for Americans is to continue to squander blood and treasure on a task too big for one country, even the world's sole superpower.

Needless to say, Dennis Kucinich has been repeating the "US out, UN in" mantra for a very, very long time. Almost two years, in fact. His first formal statement about it was on July 22, 2003, as far as I can tell from my Muslims For Kucinich archives. Here are just a few other of his major initiatives on it: October 9, 2003 - Congressman Kucinich's Iraq Strategy January 10, 2004 - UN in, US out, Ten-Point Plan to Bring Our Troops Home From Iraq July 9, 2004 - Iraq exit strategy language adopted to the Democratic platform June 4, 2005 - Supporting the Woolsey Amendment for Withdrawal from Iraq And, most recently: June 15, 2005 - Bipartisan Coalition Calling on President to Set Plan For Beginning Phase-out of US Troops in Iraq What can I say? Dennis, when you're right, you're right.

Downing Street Memo IV

In what seems to have become a weekly feature, Michael Smith of London's Sunday Times reveals yet another secret British memo. This one was produced by the Foreign Office in March 2002 (as part of the six memos set; see clarification at end) and says that military action taken to "pressurize" (i.e., provoke) Iraq was illegal under international law. As Smith makes clear in his companion article, that kind of military action was exactly what the U.S. was engaged in starting in May 2002 with stepped up bombing raids on Iraq, and which Britain soon joined in. Smith himself revealed this almost three weeks ago in the Times (see RAF bombing raids tried to goad Saddam into war). At the end of that article, he noted, The systematic targeting of Iraqi air defences appears to contradict Foreign Office legal guidance appended to the leaked briefing paper which said that the allied aircraft were only "entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force is a necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems". This is the "Foreign Office legal guidance appended to the leaked briefing paper" that Smith was referring to then. Without further ado, here's the text of the newest leaked memo, presented here with the others for the widest possible dissemination:

CONFIDENTIAL IRAQ: LEGAL BACKGROUND (i) Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions (b) Self-defence (c) Humanitarian Intervention (ii) No Fly Zones (iii) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the sanctions regime (iv) Security Council Resolutions relevant to UNMOVIC (I)Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Authorisation of the Use of Force 1. Following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council authorised the use of force against Iraq in resolution 678(1990); this resolution authorised coalition forces to use all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw, and to restore international peace and security in the area. This resolution gave a legal basis for Operation Desert Storm, which was brought to an end by the cease-fire set out by the Council in resolution 687 (1991). The conditions for the cease-fire in that resolution (and subsequent resolutions) imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution 687 (1991) suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force in resolution 678 (1990). 2. In the UK's view a violation of Iraq's obligations which undermines the basis of the cease-fire in resolution 687 (1991) can revive the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990). As the cease-fire was proclaimed by the Council in resolution 687 (1991), it is for the Council to assess whether any such breach of those obligations has occurred. The US have a rather different view: they maintain that the assessment of breach is for individual member states. We are not aware of any other state which supports this view. 3. The authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678(1990) has been revived in this way on certain occasions. For example, when Iraq refused to cooperate with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1997/8, a series of SCRs condemned the decision as unacceptable. In resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned Iraq's decision to end all co-operations with UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of Iraq's obligations under resolution 687 (1991), and restated that the effective operation of UNSCOM was essential for the implementation of that Resolution. In our view these resolutions had the effect of causing the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1991) to revive, which provided a legal basis for Operation Desert Fox. In a letter to the President of the Security Council in 1998 we stated that the objective of that operation was to seek compliance by Iraq with the obligations laid down by the Council, that the operation was undertaken only when it became apparent that there was no other way of achieving compliance by Iraq, and that the action was limited to what was necessary to secure this objective. 4. The more difficult issue is whether we are still able to rely on the same legal base for the use of force more than three years after the adoption of resolution 1205 (1998). Military action in 1998 (and on previous occasions) followed on from specific decisions of the Council; there has now not been any significant decision by the Council since 1998. Our interpretation of resolution 1205 was controversial anyway; many of our partners did not think the legal basis was sufficient as the authority to use force was not explicit. Reliance on it now would be unlikely to receive any support. Use of Force: (b) Self-Defence 5 The conditions that have to be met for the exercise of the right of self-defence are well-known: i) There must be an armed attack upon a state or such and attack must be imminent; ii) The use of force must be necessary and other means to reverse/avert the attack must be unavailable; iii) The acts in self-defence must be proportionate and strictly confined to the object of stopping the attack. iv) The right of self-defence may only be exercised until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to ensure international peace and security and anything done in exercise of the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to the council. 6. For the exercise of the right to self-defence there must be more than "a threat". There has to be an armed attack actual or imminent. The development or possession of nuclear weapons does not in itself amount to an armed attack; what would be needed would be clear evidence of an imminent attack. During the Cold War, there was certainly a threat in the sense that various states had nuclear weapons which they might, at short notice unleash upon each other. But that did not mean the mere possession of nuclear weapons, or indeed their possession in time of high tension or attempt to obtain them, was sufficient to justify pre-emptive action. And when Israel attacked an Iraqi nuclear reactor, near Baghdad, on 7 June 1981 it was "strongly condemned" by the Security Council (acting unanimously) as a "military attack in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct." Use of Force: (c) Humanitarian Intervention 7. In the UK view, the use of force may be justified if the action is taken to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. The limits to this highly contentious doctrine are not clearly defined, but we would maintain that the catastrophe must be clear and well-documented, that there must be no other means short of the use of force which could prevent it, and that the measures taken must be proportionate. This doctrine partly underlies the very limited action taken by allied aircraft to patrol the No Fly zones in Iraq (following action by Saddam to repress the Kurds and the Shia in the early 90s), which involves occasional and limited use of force by those aircraft in self-defence. The application of this doctrine depends on the circumstances at any given time, but it is clearly exceptional. (ii) No Fly Zones (NFZs) 8. The NFZs over Northern and Southern Iraq are not established by UN Security Council Resolutions. They were established in 1991 and 1992 on the basis that they were necessary and proportionate steps taken to prevent a humanitarian crisis. Prior to the establishment of the Northern NFZ the Security Council had adopted resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1991 in which the Council stated that it was gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which had led to a massive refugee flow, and that it was deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved. The resolution condemned that repression of the Iraqi civilian population and demanded that Iraq immediately end the repression. In our view, the purpose of the NFZs is to monitor Iraqi compliance with the provisions of resolution 688. UK and US aircraft patrolling the NFZs are entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force is a necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems. 9. The US have on occasion claimed that the purpose of the NFZs is to enforce Iraqi compliance with resolutions 687 or 688. This view is not consistent with resolution 687, which does not deal with the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, or with resolution 688, which was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and does not contain any provision for enforcement. Nor (as it is sometimes claimed) were the current NFZs provided for in the Safwan agreement, a provisional agreement between coalition and Iraqi military commanders of 3 March 1991, laying down military conditions for the cease-fire which did not contain any reference to the NFZs. (iii) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the sanctions regime 10. The sanctions regime against Iraq was established by resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, which, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, decides that all states shall prevent the import into their territories of any commodities originating in Iraq, the sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities other than medical supplies, and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs, and that Iraqi funds and financial resources should be frozen. Resolution 661 remains in force. The major exception to the sanctions regime is the oil for food programme, which was established by resolution 988 (1995) and permits oil exports (in unlimited amounts following resolution 1284 (1999)) by Iraq on condition that the purchase price is paid into an escrow account established by the UN Secretary-General, and the funds in that account are used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the export of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. The escrow account is also used to fund the UN Compensation Commission and to meet the operating costs of the UN, including those of UNMOVIC (see below). 11. The oil for food programme is renewed by the Security Council at (usually) 6 Monthly intervals, most recently by resolutions 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001. Under that resolution the Council also decided that it would adopt, by 13 May 2002, procedures which would improve the flow of goods to Iraq, other than arms and other potential dual use goods on a Good Review List. The US are currently reviewing the final details of the list with the Russians. 12. In resolution 687 (1991) the Council decided that the prohibition against the import of goods from Iraq should have no further force when Iraq has completed all the actions contemplated in paragraphs 8-13 of that resolution concerning Iraq's WMD Programme. Iraq has still not complied with this condition. Under paragraph 21 of resolution 687, the council decided to review the prohibition against the supply of commodities to Iraq every 60 days in the light of the policies and practices of the Iraqi government, including the implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift them. These regular reviews are currently suspended as a result of Iraqi non-compliance with the Council's demands. 13. The intention of the Council to act in accordance with resolution 687 on the termination of these prohibitions has been regularly reaffirmed, including in resolution 1284 (1999). Paragraph 33 of that resolution also contains a complex formula for the suspension of economic sanctions against Iraq for renewable periods of 120 days, if UNMOVIC and the IAEA report cooperation in all respects by Iraq in fulfilling work programmes with those bodies for a period of 120 days after a reinforced system of monitoring and verification in Iraq becomes fully operational. Iraq has never complied with these conditions. (iv) Security Council Resolutions relating to UNMOVIC 14. UNMOVIC was established by resolution 1284 (1999) to replace the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) established under resolution 687 (1991) (the ceasefire resolution). UNMOVIC is to undertake the responsibilities of the former Special Commission under resolution 687 relating to the destruction of Iraqi CBW and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometres and the on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with these obligations. Like the Special Commission, UNMOVIC is to be allowed unconditional access to all Iraqi facilities, equipment and records as well as to Iraqi officials. Under paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 UNMOVIC and the IAEA were given the responsibility of drawing up a work programme which would include the implementation of a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) and key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance. There are currently no UNMOVIC personnel in Iraq, and the reinforced OMV system has not been implemented, because of Iraq's refusal to cooperate.

Added: This is actually one of the "six memos", the one called "Iraq: Legal Background", but appears again as an annex to the briefing paper (as noted above), making it worth a story of its own.

Downing Street Memo III

Six more memos (large ZIP file containing PDFs), verified by NBC. Added: For more about the source of these memos, see the notes here. And see also here.

Downing Street Memo II

The original "Downing Street Memo" is actually the minutes of a secret meeting of British prime minister Tony Blair and his top foreign, defense, and intelligence advisors and ministers. Here's a real memo, a briefing paper produced in preparation for the meeting. Courtesy of London's Sunday Times.

Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the source. PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note by Officials) Summary Ministers are invited to: (1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for possible action. (2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. (3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic political strategy, which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions necessary to justify government military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August. (4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002. (5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US. Introduction 1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it. 2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted. 3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US Government to place its military planning within a political framework, partly to forestall the risk that military action is precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support. 4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK support for military action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, and other considerations taken into account. This note sets them out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US Government. Depending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on whether and in what form the UK takes part in military action. 5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in the view of UK officials, that one would necessarily follow from the other. Even if regime change is a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one. US Military Planning 6. Although no political decisions have been taken, US military planners have drafted options for the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a 'Running Start', military action could begin as early as November of this year, with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land forces deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the collapse of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up before any military action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military plans include no specifics on the strategic context either before or after the campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for the 'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail. 7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever option Ministers choose with regard to UK participation. The Viability of the Plans 8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. Their initial view is that there are a number of questions which would have to be answered before they could assess whether the plans are sound. Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight. UK Military Contribution 9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US military planning and the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD is examining how the UK might contribute to US-led action. The options range from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK could not generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in time, provided adequate basing arrangements could be made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK military involvement include the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which there is no financial provision. The Conditions Necessary for Military Action 10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the following conditions necessary for military action and UK participation: justification/legal base; an international coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of domestic opinion. Justification 11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. But regime change could result from action that is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective self-defence, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared earlier this year, is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in both the first two instances but would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality. Further legal advice would be needed on this point. 12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons inspectors. These have made no substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating. Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be allowed to continue ad infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this. 13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible that they will encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely when they are fully operational. 14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003. An International Coalition 15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform and desirable for political purposes. 16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except granting military over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be necessary. 17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing the support of NATO and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK. France might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to improve their US relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the region would be neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in military action. In practice, much of the international community would find it difficult to stand in the way of the determined course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater the prospects of success. A Quiescent Israel-Palestine 18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian violence for the time being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking more trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at best a half step forward. We are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make progress, including a resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a ministerial conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly likely. The co-incidence of such an upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to bolster popular Arab support for his regime. Benefits/Risks 19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective as set out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in particular what form of Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military action on other UK interests in the region. Domestic Opinion 20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action. Timescales 21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only because of the time it will take to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that for climactic reasons, military action would need to start by January 2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn. 22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. This means that: (a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before President Bush is briefed on 4 August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels; [last page is missing]